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"Shelter Chic": Can the
Government Make it Work?

U.S.

ABSTRACT

This Note discusses government donations of seized
counterfeit goods to charitableinstitutions and the implications
of these practices. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
contributions to the Red Cross for the Hurricane Katrina relief
effort serve as a backdrop for important concepts. In making
these contributions, the CBP relied on its emergency authority
and a presidential proclamation to avoid basic statutory
requirements that it (a) obtain consent from the right holders
and (b) de-trademark counterfeit goods priorto donation. While
the donations inarguably benefitted countless disaster victims
and freed up valuable CBP warehouse space, they may have had
a detrimental impact on trademark holders' rights and the U.S.
government's image as a forerunner in global IP rights
enforcement.
Additionally,
the
CBP's post-Katrina
contributions raise concerns as to the legality of such donations
under federal and international law. This Note weighs the
various interests at stake and ultimately suggests policies for
avoiding the unnecessary sacrifice of trademark holders' rights
in future government donations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................
1664
BACKGROUND ...................................................
1667

A.

The Costs of Counterfeiting................................
1.
The Economic Cost ...................................
ii.
The Hum an Cost .......................................
Legal A uthority...................................................
i.
The TRIPS Agreement .............................
ii.
U.S. Customs Duties .................................
ill.
Emergency Authority ...............................

1667
1667
1670
1674
1674
1677
1679

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ....................................................

1680

A.

1680
1680
1682
1682

B.

III.

Under TRIPS ......................................................
i.
The WTO Panel Report ............................
a. Defective Goods ..................................
b. Harm to Reputation ...........................
1663

1664

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 421663

c.
d.

Later Sales of Donated Goods ...........
Release into the Channels of
Com m erce
......................................
ii.
Application to the CBP's Donations ........
a. Release into the Channels of
Com m erce
......................................
b. Disposal Outside the Channels of
Com m erce
......................................
Under U.S. Law ..................................................

1685

POLICY IMPLICATIONS: SENDING MIXED SIGNALS ........

1696

A.
B.

The Message to U.S. Citizens .............................
The Global M essage ............................................

1697
1698

RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................
CONCLUSION ..................................................................

1699
1700

B.
IV.

V.
V I.

1687
1689
1690
1692
1695

I. INTRODUCTION

The children displaced by Hurricane Katrina may have been the
new kids at school that fall, but at least they were dressed to impress.
Thanks to the federal government, their back-to-school wardrobes
boasted a variety of fashion-forward labels. After surviving a natural
disaster that left many homeless and with nothing but the clothes on
their backs, displaced Katrina victims in Texas and Mississippi were
permitted to choose from several hundreds of thousands of articles of
brand-new, knock-off designer clothing donated by the Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) division of the Department of Homeland
Security.'
During the fall of 2005, the CBP joined the list of various
charities, businesses, and other organizations that contributed to the
Hurricane Katrina relief effort. 2 Customs workers emptied several
warehouses full of seized counterfeit goods into CBP tractor-trailers
for distribution to displaced victims finding refuge in places like the
Houston Astrodome. 3 The donations, which eventually exceeded

1.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
ICE, CBP Donate Seized Clothes to Katrina Victims, INSIDE ICE, Sept. 20, 2005, at 5, 5;
Fakes Put to Good Use, FASHIONUNITED, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.fashionunited.co.uk/
Contentby.Mail/Received _content/Fakes-put-to-good-use_200509084758/.
2.
Anna Gorman, U.S. to Give Seized Items to Katrina Victims, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2005, at A29, available at http:larticles.latimes.com2005/seplOlocal/meseizedlO.
3.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supranote 1, at 5.
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twenty million dollars in value, 4 included everything from knock-off
designer jackets, t-shirts, pants, and hats, to counterfeit bedding,
5
toys, and even dog food.
Criticism of the federal government's delayed response to
Katrina was severe. 6 But praise for the CBP's donations, by contrast,
was emphatic. 7 Finally, it seemed, the government had done
something right: useful items, which would have otherwise been
destroyed, were put to good use,8 and customs enjoyed the added
benefit of extra warehouse space. 9 Under this pragmatic solution,
everyone seemed to win.
Amidst the resounding praise, however, there was a nearly
inaudible voice of dissent. The CPB donations may have been a
blessing for the victims of Katrina, but they were a nightmare for the
owners of the affected trademarks. 10 Most counterfeit goods entering
United States' borders go undetected by law enforcement, so these
items represented the small percentage of counterfeit goods that did
not fly under the radar. 1 ' Customs authorities impounded these
items, yet ultimately they were redistributed to the public by the
12
same hands that seized them.
In its act of charity, the federal government sacrificed the rights
of the trademark holders. The CBP made no attempts to first contact
the trademark holders to gain consent for the donations. 13 The CBP
also made no efforts to remove or obscure the infringing trademarks

4.
Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Donates More Than 100,000 Pieces of Seized
Goods for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Mississippi (Sept. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news-releases/archives/2005-press-releases/092
005/09122005.xml.
5.
Seized Knockoff Items Going to Hurricane Victims, Fox NEWS, Sept. 5,
2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168513,00.html.
6.
See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Katrina Report Spreads Blame: Homeland
Security, Chertoff Singled Out, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.conVwp-dyn/contentarticle/2006/02/1 1/AR200602110149.html
(noting widespread criticism of the Bush administration's response to Katrina).
7.
See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 2 (noting support for the program).
8.
Id.
9.
Susan Scafidi, Katrina Pounds Trademarks: It's Good and Bad That
HurricaneSurvivors Are Getting Counterfeit Wares, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, supp.

10.
Id.
11.
Counterfeit
Chic,
Counterfeits
for
Katrina
Victims-Again,
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2006/02/counterfeits-for-katrina-victi-i.php (Feb. 3, 2006,
12:58 EST).
12.
See Counterfeit Chic, Year in Review I: Katrina and Counterfeits,
http://counterfeitchic.com2005/12/index.php (Dec. 26, 2005, 22:13 EST) (describing the
redistribution by the CBP).
13.
See Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 4 (noting that
at no point did the CBP receive the prior authorization from those whose trademarks
were violated by the counterfeit clothing that was distributed to Katrina victims).
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(i.e., to "de-trademark" the goods) prior to redistribution. 14 Instead,
CBP officials imprudently and unilaterally doled out goods that
prominently-and erroneously-displayed designer names. 15
The affected trademark owners were, unsurprisingly, less than
enthusiastic about the government's generosity. 16
The CBP's
donations raised legitimate business concerns for several prominent
brands. After all, these companies certainly did not spend millions of
dollars in high-end advertising only to be associated with "shelter
chic.' 7 Moreover, the trademark owners could exercise no control
over the quality and safety of these donated goods that would
necessarily be associated with their products.' 8 This being said,
"[w]ould any prominent brand be churlish enough to tear a fauxdesigner blanket away from a shivering family?"'19 As Professor
Susan Scafidi points out, nobody would want to "run the public
relations risk of taking candy from babies--or clothing from Katrina
victims." 20 But the interests at stake were not as simple as the
wellbeing of displaced U.S. citizens versus the property rights of U.S.
corporations.
Even less audible than the voices of the trademark holders were
the voices of a separate set of victims halfway around the world,
victims whose losses were more tangible than future lost sales or
brand image deterioration. These victims are the casualties of the
various terrorist groups funded by counterfeit trade, 21 as well as
laborers in foreign counterfeit factories, who earn a fraction of
minimum wage in conditions tantamount to slave labor. 22 Adamant
in its condemnation of these practices, the U.S. government has been
at the forefront of international intellectual property (IP) law
enforcement. 23 Yet by nevertheless distributing the fruits of foreign

14.
See Scafidi, supra note 9, supp. (explaining that the impact of the CBP's
donations on the trademark owners would have been mitigated if the CBP had
obscured the trademarks on the counterfeit items before donation).
15.
See id. ("Unless a cadre of customs officials armed with tiny scissors and
indelible pens has been deployed to carefully remove or obscure the trademarks on
knockoff jeans, shoes, baseball caps, and even toys, these items proudly-and falselydeclare their designer origin.").
16.
See Counterfeit Chic, Counterfeits for Katrina Victims-Again, supra note
11 ("[A]I1 trademark owners weren't necessarily thrilled that the small percentage of
counterfeit merchandise actually impounded by law enforcement is back on the
streets.").
17.
Scafidi, supra note 9, supp.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Counterfeit Chic, Counterfeits for Katrina Victims-Again, supranote 11.
21.
Dana Thomas, If You Buy One of These Fake Bags, You Are Supporting
Child Labor, Organized Crime, Even Terrorism ... , HARPER's BAZAAR, Jan. 2005, at
64, 65-66.
22.
Jan Goodwin, The Human Cost of Fakes, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Jan. 2006, at
53, 54.
23.
Scafidi, supra note 9, supp.
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oppression to U.S. disaster victims in an effort to "lift the nation's
spirit,"24 the government may have undercut its own position on IP
enforcement, sending the implicit message that the suffering of U.S.
25
victims is more compelling than the suffering of victims overseas.
The Katrina donations raised a number of concerns, including
the legality of the federal government's donations, and more broadly,
the state of the government's policy on counterfeit trade. This Note
weighs (a) the global interests in ending the harms related to the
counterfeit goods industry; (b) the interests of the government in
contributing to national emergency relief; and (c) the property
interests of the trademark holders involved. Part II discusses the
harms associated with counterfeit trade and introduces the relevant
legal authority, while Part III analyzes the legal implications of these
actions while applying provisions of international and federal law.
Part IV addresses the international policy implications raised by the
CBP's donations, and lastly Part V evaluates potential options for
future CBP donations. Ultimately, this Note argues that the CBP
unnecessarily sacrificed the rights of trademark holders and thereby
violated provisions of international trade law in making its donations
to the Katrina relief effort.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Costs of Counterfeiting
i.

The Economic Cost

The magnitude of international counterfeit trade should not be
Counterfeit goods make up an estimated ten
underestimated.
percent of all products sold worldwide, 26 and these products are not
confined to the fashion industry. 2 7 In 1985, Business Week referred to
counterfeiting as "[p]erhaps the world's fastest-growing and most

See Jerry Seper, Seized Garments Donated to Storm Evacuees, WASH.
24.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A14, available at http://washingtontimes.com/news/20O5/sep/
07/20050907-102011-9947r/ (quoting Robert Trotter, CBP director of field operations in
Houston, as stating that the "CBP's mission is to protect the nation from terrorists and
their weapons, but today we're here to lift the nation's spirit as well").
25.
Scafidi, supra note 9, at S6.
26.
Dana Thomas, The Fake Trade: Wanted for Stealing Childhoods, HARPER'S
BAZAAR, Jan. 2007, at 69, 70.
27.
Counterfeiters have been known to fake everything from medicines and
personal care items to automotive brakes and luxury cars. Dana Thomas, The Fake
Trade: Counterfeiting is a Business Worth $600 Billion a Year--and Growing,
HARPER'S BAZAAR, Jan. 2008, at 71, 72.
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profitable business. '28 A decade later, Fortune Magazine named it
"the crime of the twenty-first century. '29 In the last twenty-six years,
counterfeiting has grown from a $5.5 billion-per-year business to a
$600 billion-per-year industry. 30
Known as a highly-lucrative
business with relatively low risks, it continues to grow
exponentially. 3 1
Its success lies in consumer ignorance;
counterfeiting flourishes where other illegal industries fall short
'32
because consumers continue to think of it as a "victimless crime.
33
To the contrary, we are all victims of counterfeiting.
The harm
touches everyone affected by the resulting job shortages and the loss
of tax revenues that could be used to improve schools, roads, and
other community functions. 34 Specifically, counterfeiting has cost an
estimated 750,000 Americans their jobs and costs the city of New
35
York alone an estimated $1 billion per year in tax revenues.
Trademark owners incur substantial costs as a result of
counterfeiting. The most obvious of these is a loss of sales revenue
from consumers choosing counterfeit goods over their more expensive
counterparts. 36 But trademark owners also experience deferred costs,
as the free availability of counterfeits results in a loss of consumer
goodwill and brand prestige. 3 7 Traditional trademark theory posits
that "[wihen a firm invests in its reputation by delivering a promised

28.
Thomas C. O'Donnell et al., The Counterfeit Trade, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 16,
1985, at 64, 64.
29.
David Stipp & Sheree R. Curry, Farewell, My Logo, FORTUNE, May 27,
1996, at 128, 129.
30.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeiting is a Business Worth $600 Billion a
Year--and Growing, supra note 27, at 72.
31.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Wanted for Stealing Childhoods, supra note 26,
at 72. Incidentally, China's transformation into a manufacturing giant coincided with
the rapid development of counterfeit trade. Desmond Butler, Crime Watch: The Sad
Truth Behind Your Bargain Timepiece, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Jan. 2005, at 66, 66.
32.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeitingis a Business Worth $600 Billion a
Year-and Growing, supra note 27, at 72. A British study published in 2007 reported
that almost two-thirds of consumers in the U.K. are "proud to tell their family and
friends that they bought fake luxury clothing, footwear, watches or jewelory."
Davenport Lyons, Fake Luxury Goods Shift Into Social Acceptance; But Who Benefits?,
http://www.davenportlyons.com/legal-services/articles/424/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
33.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeiting is a Business Worth $600 Billion a
Year-and Growing,supra note 27, at 72.
34.
Id.
35.
Harper's Bazaar, Fakes are Never in Fashion: Numbers to Know,
http://www.fakesareneverinfashion.com/fakesnumbers.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
36.
See Michael Blakeny, The Phenomenon of Counterfeiting and Piracy in the
European Union: Factual Overview and Legal and Institutional Framework, in
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH BORDER MEASURES 1, 7-

8, 1.18 (Olivier Vrins & Marius Schneider eds., 2006) ("[C]ounterfeiting accounts for
between 5 and 7 per cent of world trade in value terms. The immediate impact of this
global trade is the loss of sales and the consequent impact upon employment.").
37.
See id. para. 1.14 ('The costs to businesses whose products are pirated and
counterfeited include ... loss of goodwill and prestige by a brand, where counterfeits
are freely available .... ").

2009]

SHELTER CHIC" CAN THE US. MAKE IT WORK?

quality, it develops goodwill with its customers. Trademarks allow
consumers to identify the products of companies that have satisfied
them in the past. Thus, a trademark becomes an asset to the firm,
embodying its accumulated goodwill. '38
When a counterfeiter
produces products disguised as those of a legitimate brand but cuts
corners with the quality of the products, the accumulated goodwill in
39
the legitimate brand decreases.
In addition, modern marketing has significantly enhanced the
value of trademarks. 40 Trademarks traditionally served to identify
41
the sources of products, but today they also "adorn" products.
Consumers now see the logo as an essential part of the product itself
and perhaps as a new commodity altogether. 4 2
Consequently,
"brands are among the most valuable assets that a company.., can
possess. '4 3 Corporations spend millions of dollars nurturing and
protecting these investments. 44 Counterfeiters, however, avoid the
costs of research, development, and marketing by free-riding off of the
investments of legitimate businesses. 45 As a result, the trademark
owner experiences a further cost in the form of a competitive

38.

Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Counterfeit-Product Trade, 78 AM.

ECON. REV. 59, 60 (1988).

39.
See Blakeny, supra note 36, para. 1.14 ("The costs to businesses whose
products are pirated and counterfeited include ...loss of goodwill and prestige by a
brand, where counterfeits are freely available ....").
40.
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 17-26 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the impact of

marketing and consumer awareness upon the value of a trademark).
41.
Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993).
42.
See id. ("There's a growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify
products but also to enhance or adorn them, even to create new commodities
altogether."). Professor Jeremy Phillips explains that trademarks often reflect a
"desirable image or lifestyle into which consumers wish to buy. Whether the goods are
real or fake, the message of the brand or design is unchanged." Jeremy Phillips,
Intellectual Property: Borders and Crossroads, in ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH BORDER MEASURES, supra note 36, at 1099, 1104, para.

29.16.
43.
Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined For the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP.
585, 595 (2002). In fact, a 2002 World Intellectual Property Organization report
estimated that intellectual property rights represent between forty-five and seventyfive percent of the overall corporate value of Fortune 500 companies. Ian Cockburn,
Assessing the Value of a Patent: Things to Bear in Mind, http://www.wipo.intlsme/
enldocuments/valuing-patents.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
44.
See Alexandra DeFelice, Marketing Expenditures will Double this Year,
DESTINATION CRM, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.destinationcrm.com/Articles/Read
Article.aspx?ArticleID=47652 ("Direct, targeted marketing expenditures will more than
double that of traditional mass marketing in 2006, reaching roughly $508 billion
compared to $230 billion, according to the Winterberry Group. ").
45.
INVL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION, CREATIVITY, GROWTH AND PROGRESS 15 (2005).

SOURCE OF
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disadvantage with respect to counterfeiters; 4 6 it "cannot 'compete'
47
with pirates and counterfeiters on the price of products.,
48
This phenomenon leads to serious market distortions.
American companies alone lose an estimated $20 billion per year to
the counterfeit industry. 49
However, this figure alone does not
adequately represent the cost to American industry. Trademark
owners also bear various legal costs, including the possibility of
product liability for defective counterfeit goods and "the expense of

monitoring for infringement and instituting legal proceedings against
infringers. ' 50

Moreover, IP theft "strikes at the heart of one of [the

1
U.S.'s] greatest comparative advantages-[its] innovative capacity."'

The contributions of American inventors, researchers, entrepreneurs,
artists, and workers have made the world a better place. 52 Allowing
counterfeiters to freeload off these legitimate efforts disincentivizes
5
American innovation.

ii.

3

The Human Cost

Consumers of counterfeit goods unknowingly contribute to
international criminal organizations that deal in money laundering,
child labor, human trafficking, and even terrorism.5 4 Counterfeiters
often hire children, mistreat workers, and maintain deplorable
working and living conditions.5 5 In the Chinese city of Guangzou, the

46.
See Blakeny, supra note 36, para. 1.14 ('The costs to those businesses
whose products are pirated and counterfeited include ... competitive disadvantage to
those enterprises which free-ride on the research and development and marketing
expenses of legitimate enterprises ....
").
47.

INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 45, at 15. These business risks

are not confined to large corporations. Even "mom-and-pop" retailers struggle to
compete with counterfeiters when consumers have the option of buying generic
products from a legitimate store or "brand name" products for the same price from the
next store over. Counterfeit Goods, Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 5
(2005) (statement of Kris Buckner, President, Investigative Consultants).
48.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 45, at 15.
49.
Harper's Bazaar, Fakes are Never in Fashion: Numbers to Know, supra
note 35.
50.
Blakeny, supra note 36, para. 1.14.
51.
NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION COUNSEL,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION 1 (2006).
52.
Id.

53.
Swann, supra note 43, at 590-91.
54.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeiting is a Business Worth $600 Billion a
Year--and Growing, supra note 27, at 72.
55.
See Goodwin, supra note 22, at 54 (detailing the gruesome death of five
teenage factory workers). For example, author Dana Thomas, while accompanying Thai
authorities on a counterfeit assembly plant raid, recounted a story told to her by an
investigator about a horrific scene that the investigator had witnessed during the
course of another raid:

"SHELTER CHIC: CAN THE US MAKE IT WORK?
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capital of counterfeit production and home of many clandestine
factories that exist solely to produce counterfeit goods, many factory
owners hire children under the age of sixteen to live on the premises
with no adult supervision. 56 Shifts may begin as early as 7:00 a.m.
and sometimes last well into the next day. 57 Child laborers work
these shifts every day and sometimes get only one day off per year. 58
If they receive a paycheck at all, it is worth only "a fraction of the
[Chinese] minimum wage." 59
These inhumane working conditions have also found their way
into America's own backyard. Many foreign counterfeit factory
workers are sold into indentured servitude and smuggled from Asia
into cities like New York and Los Angeles. 60 This way, counterfeiters
can import components of fake goods for later assembly by their
domestic workforce, thereby avoiding U.S. Customs seizures at the
border. 6 1 Police raids of domestic sweatshops are often unsuccessful
because the counterfeiters padlock doors to keep workers from
escaping.

62

'I remember walking into an assembly plant in Thailand a couple years ago and
seeing six or seven little children, all under ten years old, sitting on the floor
assembling counterfeit leather handbags ....
The owners had broken the
children's legs and tied the lower leg to the thigh so the bones wouldn't mend'
and did so 'because the children said they wanted to go outside and play.'
DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: How LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 288 (2007).
56.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Wanted for Stealing Childhoods, supra note 26,
at 69-70. Harper's Bazaar vividly described the horrific story of Wang Yajuan, a
Chinese child laborer in another city:
[Wang Yajuan] was working at a textile factory, near Shijiazhuang City, Hebei
Province, when she was fourteen. Along with other children, she toiled at least
twelve hours a day, seven days a week, and slept in a ramshackle factory dorm,
unheated in the frigid winter. Exhausted after their long workday, Yajuan and
her four roommates lit a primitive charcoal stove one night in December 2004
and went to sleep in the poorly ventilated room. In the morning they were
found unconscious from inhaling charcoal fumes and declared dead. The factory
owner ordered that the girls' bodies be sealed in coffins immediately and sent
off for cremation. A later investigation revealed that at least two of the girls
had still been alive when they were entombed.
Goodwin, supra note 22, at 54.
57.
Goodwin, supra note 22, at 54.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Wanted for Stealing Childhoods, supra note 26,
at 70.
61.
See Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeiting is a Business Worth $600
Billion a Year-and Growing, supra note 27, at 72 ("Workers took generic items that
may have been imported legally and sewed on fake logos and labels, turning the items
into counterfeit branded goods.").
62.
Thomas, If You Buy One of These Fake Bags, You Are Supporting Child
Labor, Organized Crime, Even Terrorism .....supra note 21, at 65.
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Counterfeiters are known to be among the world's most
hardened and ruthless criminals. 63 Some are involved in common
street gangs and use the profits from counterfeit sales to buy guns
and drugs. 64
Some are terrorist sympathizers who use their
counterfeiting

profits

to support

terrorist

operations. 6 5

In

fact,

counterfeiting is quickly "becoming the preferred method of funding
for a number of terrorist groups," according to Ronald K. Noble, the
Secretary General of Interpol. 6 6

For this reason, some terrorist

organizations
even claim
direct ownership
of counterfeit
enterprises. 67 Specifically, Interpol has discovered counterfeit trade
connections with Kosovo extremist groups, Chechen rebels, and even
Al Qaeda. 68 The FBI and Interpol have also uncovered evidence of a
69
link between counterfeiting and Hezbollah.

63.
Thomas, The Fake Trade: Wanted for Stealing Childhoods, supra note 26,
at 70.
64.
Counterfeit Goods, Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists:Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2005)
(statement of Kris Buckner, President, Investigative Consultants).
65.
Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds From Counterfeited Goods
Funding Terrorism?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations, 108th
Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General, Interpol).
66.
Id. Alan C. Drewsen, Executive Director of the International Trademark
Association, admits to shying away from the topic of terrorism at first. Robert Kara, The
Fight Against Fakes, BRANDWEEK, June 27, 2009, http://www.brandweek.comibwl
contentdisplay/news-and-features/direct/e3i344418db676344f06le2b8a71119963e?pn=1].
"But there have been enough cases that there does seem to be a link. What we're finding
is that the business model for counterfeiting is better than the distribution of drugs. The
profits are high, and the penalties are lower." Id.
67.
Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds From Counterfeited Goods
Funding Terrorism?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations, 108th
Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General, Interpol). Concerns
have been raised that the public may equate these findings to the post-9/11 rhetoric
employed by anti-drug campaigns, which were largely dismissed as scare tactics
dreamed up by the Bush Administration. See Counterfeit Goods, Easy Cash for
Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 27 (2005) (statement of Matthew Levitt, Senior
Fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy) (explaining that the post-9/11 campaigns were "poorly received by the public
and [ ] became a joke"). However, Mr. Noble's conclusions are based on files from
Interpol, Interpol member states, right holders, manufacturers, and trade bodies, as
well as open sources. Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds From Counterfeited

Goods Funding Terrorism?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations,
108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General, Interpol).
Interpol is an international police organization with 187 member countries. Interpol,
About Interpol, http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp (last visited Oct. 21,
2009).
68.
Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds From Counterfeited Goods
Funding Terrorism?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th
Cong. 14-15 (2003) (statement of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General, Interpol). Some
U.S. intelligence agencies postulate that the counterfeit goods sold on New York City
streets partially funded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 attacks.
Thomas, If You Buy One of These Fake Bags, You Are Supporting Child Labor,
Organized Crime, Even Terrorism .... supra note 21, at 65. One investigation
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Nevertheless, consumer demand for counterfeit goods endures. 70
Canal Street, the heart of the Chinatown district in New York City, is
perpetually swarmed with tourists eager to purchase souvenir knockoffs. 71 Mild-mannered housewives across America continue to host
Tupperware-style "purse parties," unwittingly taking orders for
contraband from their friends and neighbors. 72 Anti-counterfeiting
experts maintain that the most effective way to combat counterfeiting
is through consumer education. 73 Counterfeit watchdog Barbara
Kolsun postulates that "if the woman buying a purse in Chinatown
knew that it was probably made by children, . . . she might think
twice about buying it."' 74 In a 2007 survey of U.K. consumers, one
British IP firm confirmed that almost eighty percent of consumers
"would be deterred if they knew that sales help to fund criminal
activity.

'7 5

conducted by the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition led to the discovery of
flight manuals similar to those used by 9/11 attackers. Id.
69.
Counterfeit Goods, Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists:Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2005)
(statement of Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs).
70.
See Thomas, The Fake Trade: Wanted for Stealing Childhoods, supra note
26, at 70 ("[C]ounterfeiting thrives because there is a sizable market for fakes.").
71.
Klara, supra note 66. In fact, many tourism websites provide maps of Canal
Street that highlight vendor locations and provide tips for shopping for knock-offs. See,
e.g., A Journey Through Chinatown, Canal Street Map, http://www.nychinatown.org/
canal2.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (Chinatown's own website advertising illegal
shopping opportunities in the area); Travels With Tish: Girlfriends' Getaway Guide,
http://girlfriendsgetaway.wordpress.com/category/canal-street-new-york/
(last visited
Oct. 21, 2007) (urging tourists to "pack lean and light-and save lots of room for those
knock-off... purse bargains!").
72.
Lenore Skenazy, Op-Ed., Knock Off the Knockoffs, CREATOR'S SYNDICATE,
Feb.
28,
2008,
http://www.creators.com/opinion/lenore-skenazy/knock-off-theknockoffs.html; see also WLWT Eyewitness News 5: Purse Parties:Harmless Hobby or
Fashion Felony? (CBS television broadcast May 16, 2003), available at
http://www.wlwt.com/news/2207934/detail.html (discussing the criminal nature of
counterfeit "purse parties").
73.
See Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeiting is a Business Worth $600
Billion a Year-and Growing, supra note 27, at 73 ("Most important, we need to spread
the word on the devastating effects counterfeiting has on society today."); Thomas, If
You Buy One of These Fake Bags, You Are Supporting Child Labor, Organized Crime,
Even Terrorism .... supra note 21, at 67 ("Perhaps the most effective way to stop
counterfeiting is through educating those of us who love fashion and a bargain and are
vulnerable to unscrupulous counterfeiters.").
74.
Thomas, If You Buy One of These Fake Bags, You Are Supporting Child
Labor, Organized Crime, Even Terrorism ....,supra note 21, at 67; see also id. at 65
("'If women were aware that [the production of] these bags means employing illegal
labor, including children, I don't think they would be having Tupperware-style parties
to sell them,' says Andy Spade, CEO and creative director of Kate Spade and Jack
Spade.") (alteration in original).
75.
Davenport Lyons, supra note 32. Author and anti-counterfeiting advocate
Dana Thomas attests that audience members at book-readings often tell her "they had
no idea it was such a dark and dangerous world," then "invariably swear that they will
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B. Legal Authority
i.

The TRIPS Agreement

The requirements established by the World Trade Organization's
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
These
(the TRIPS Agreement) govern U.S. IP regulation.7 6
requirements function as minimum standards, and Member countries
are free to implement more restrictive measures.7 7 Part III of the
Agreement concerns the enforcement of IP rights.7 8 While it focuses
on internal enforcement measures aimed at stopping infringement at
the point of production, Part III also recognizes the importance of
enforcement measures taken at a Member country's borders aimed at
stopping infringing imports. 79 Border measures provide for the
participation of customs authorities and enable them to stop
infringing goods at the point of entry, thereby preventing the release
80
of such goods into free circulation.
Article 51 of Part III requires Member countries to adopt certain
border enforcement procedures, which must at least apply to
counterfeit trademark goods presented for importation.8 1 Member
countries must designate a "competent authorit[y]," either judicial or
82
administrative, to authorize enforcement measures at the border.83
Procedures may be initiated either by application of the right holder
or upon the designated authority's own initiative.8 4 Either way, when
customs authorities suspend the release of goods, both the importer
8 5
and the right holder "shall be promptly notified of the suspension."
The resulting border measures adopted by Member countries
must conform to the provisions set out in Section 4 of Part III,

never knowingly buy another fake good." Thomas, The Fake Trade: Counterfeiting is a
Business Worth $600 Billion a Year-and Growing,supra note 27, at 72.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
76.
art 1(1), Jan. 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS] ("Members
shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.").
77.

DANIEL GERVAIS,

THE

TRIPS

AGREEMENT:

DRAFTING

HISTORY

AND

ANALYSIS para. 2.18, at 86-87 (2d ed. 2003).
TRIPS, supra note 76, pt. III.
78.
79.
World Trade Organization, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, Enforcement,
(last visited
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/intel2be.htm#enforcement
Oct. 21, 2009).
80.
Id.
Id. The TRIPS Agreement defines "counterfeit trademark goods" as those
81.
"bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly
registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential
aspects from such a trademark." TRIPS, supranote 76, pt. III, § 4, art. 51 n.14.
82.
World Trade Organization, supra note 79.
83.
TRIPS, supranote 76, art. 51.
Id. art. 58.
84.
85.
Id. art. 58(b).
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including Article 59,86 which authorizes "competent authorities" to
"order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods in accordance
with the principles set out in Article 46."'87 Article 59 further
stipulates that "[i]n regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the
authorities shall not allow the re-exportation of the infringing goods
in an unaltered state or subject them to a different customs
88
procedure, other than in exceptional circumstances.
Article 59 extends the principles of Article 46 (pertaining to civil
remedies) to the context of border measures.8 9 Article 46 provides:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have
found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of
outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any
harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to
existing constitutional requirements, destroyed . . . . In considering

such requests, the need for proportionality between the seriousness of
the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of
third parties shall be taken into account. In regard to counterfeit
goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not
be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of the
90
goods into the channels of commerce.

According to Professor Daniel Gervais, the last sentence in
Article 46 establishes a general rule for the disposal of counterfeit
goods: simply "de-trademarking" counterfeit goods is not permitted
and does not constitute an "effective deterrent."91 This general rule
may only be broken in exceptional cases. 92
Professor Gervais
explains that "exceptional circumstances" would "need to be
exceptional indeed to avoid a violation of the obligation to provide an
effective deterrent. '93 The general rule, he argues, should only be
broken in "specific cases of non-professional infringement with special

86.
Panel Report, China-MeasuresAffecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, para. 7.217, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter IP
Measures Panel Report].
87.
TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 59.
88.
Id.
89.
GERVAIS, supra note 77, para. 2.465, at 324-25; see also TRIPS, supra note
76, art. 59.
Without prejudice to other rights of action open to the right holder and subject
to the right of the defendant to seek review by a judicial authority, competent
authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or disposal of
infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in Article 46.
Id. art. 59.
90.
TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 46.
91.
GERVAIS, supra note 77, para. 2.404, at 300.
92.
Id.
93.
Daniel J. Gervais, The InternationalLegal Framework of Border Measures
in the Fight Against Counterfeiting and Piracy para. 2.66, in ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH BORDER MEASURES, supra note 36, at 37,
58.
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('attenuating') circumstances. '94 Otherwise, the infringing party,
particularly professional counterfeiters, could simply acquire more
95
infringing logos and attach them to the de-trademarked goods.
Article 59, however, provides its own clause pertaining to the
disposal of counterfeit trademark goods: "In regard to counterfeit
trademark goods, the authorities shall not allow the re-exportation of
the infringing goods in an unaltered state or subject them to a
in
exceptional
other
than
procedure,
customs
different
circumstances." 9 6 At first glance, the difference in the wording of
Article 59 would seem to exclude the incorporation of the fourth
sentence of Article 46.97 But the language in Article 59 pertains to
the re-export or release of goods into a different customs procedure,
while the language in Article 46 pertains to release into the channels
of commerce, which applies to importation and domestic sale. 98 Thus,
the different sentences in each Article apply in different
circumstances and do not contradict one another. 99 Therefore, Article
59 incorporates all "principles set out in Article 46" 1 00-including the
general rule prohibiting the simple de-trademarking of counterfeit
goods.
Part V governs any disputes between Member countries arising
out of the TRIPS Agreement.1 0 1 Under the provisions set out in
Article 64, a WTO Member may initiate a "violation complaint"
02
invoking another Member's failure to carry out TRIPS obligations.'
During the first five years after the TRIPS Agreement entered into
force, only violation complaints were permitted.' 0 3 Essentially, this
required a showing of "direct conflict between provisions of 10 a4
Member's laws and regulations and TRIPS, including an omission.
Since January 1, 2000, however, Members may also initiate "non-

94.

GERVAIS, supra note 77, para. 2.404, at 300.

Id.; see also supra note 61 (discussing how domestic workers re-attach logos
95.
to de-trademarked goods).
TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 59.
96.
97.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.271(noting the argument
that "the second sentence of Article 59 constitutes a lex specialis that would exclude the
incorporation of the fourth sentence of Article 46 into Article 59").
Id. para. 7.274.
98.
Id.
99.
100. Id. para. 7.270; see also Executive Summary of the Oral Statement of the
United States at the First Substantive Meeting, China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, § II, para. 24, WT/DS362/R
(Jan. 26, 2009) (articulating the U.S. argument that Article 59 does not contain
limiting language that would "selectively incorporate the obligations in Article 46.").
See TRIPS, supra note 76, pt. V (providing for dispute settlement).
101.
102.
See GERVAIS, supra note 77, para. 2.495, at 341 (explaining that under Art.
64, a Member could invoke the "failure of another [WTO Member] to carry out its
obligations under the agreement") (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
103. Id.
104.

Id.
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violation complaints," relying on "non-violation nullification or
impairment and unavailability of benefits based on reasonable
expectations." 10 5 This argument might apply, for example, where a
Member's laws and regulations conform to TRIPS obligations, yet the
Member systematically refuses to apply those laws and regulations,
thereby nullifying or impairing a benefit expected to accrue (whether
06
directly or indirectly) under TRIPS.'
ii.

U.S. Customs Duties

As a frontrunner in international IP rights enforcement, 10 7 the
U.S. has implemented measures that offer more protection for IP
rights than the minimum standards prescribed by TRIPS. The U.S.
has made border enforcement measures a priority, as many
counterfeit goods sold within the U.S. are imports manufactured
overseas.1 08 Consequently, when the CBP discovers goods bearing
counterfeit marks, 0 9 it has a statutory duty to seize the goods. 1 10
Absent written consent from the trademark owner, the goods are then
forfeited to the CBP. 1I 1 The CBP has a duty to provide notice to the
trademark owner 1 2 within thirty days of the seizure. 113 For thirty
days following this notification, the trademark owner may provide
consent to importation or exportation of the goods, to entry of the
goods on the condition that they be de-trademarked, or to some "other
appropriate disposition." 11 4 If the trademark owner does not provide
consent, the CBP must dispose of the goods in accordance with 19
115
U.S.C. § 1526(e) and 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c).
Under normal circumstances, the CBP must destroy the
goods. 116 In some circumstances, however, destruction of the goods is

105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Scafidi, supra note 9, supp.

108.
CAN. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING NETWORK, REPORT ON COUNTERFEITING AND
PIRACY IN CANADA: A ROAD MAP FOR CHANGE 39 (2007).

109.
A "counterfeit", defined under the Lanham Act, is "a spurious mark, which
is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2009); see also 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a) (2009) ("A 'counterfeit trademark' is a
spurious trademark that is identical to, or substantially indistinguishable from, a
registered trademark.").
110.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2009); see also 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) (describing a
corresponding regulatory duty).
111.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b).
112.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e).
113.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c).
114.
Id. § 133.21(e).
115.

Id.

116.

19 U.S.C. § 1526(e); 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c) (2009).
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not mandatory.11 7 Statutory and regulatory duties do not require the
CBP to destroy seized counterfeit goods when the following three
prerequisites are met: (1) the goods are not unsafe and do not
constitute a health hazard; (2) the CBP has obtained the trademark
owner's written consent; and (3) the CBP has de-trademarked the
1 18
goods where feasible.
If all three prerequisites are satisfied, there are two alternatives
to destruction. 119 First, the CBP may deliver the goods to any
government agency or charitable institution that establishes a need
for them. 120
If no government agency or charitable institution
establishes a need for the goods within ninety days, the CBP may also
sell the goods at a public auction. 121 As long as the decision satisfies
the statute and regulations, the choice of alternatives ultimately lies
with the Executive Branch, acting either through the Secretary of the
122
Treasury or through the Commissioner of Customs or his designee.

117.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (setting out conditions for alternative disposal
methods); 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c) (same).
118.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e); 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c).
119.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e)(l)-(3); 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c)(1)-(3).
120.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e)(1)-(2); 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c)(1)-(2).
121.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(e)(3); 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c)(3).
122.
United States v. One Lot of Approximately Twenty Thousand Pairs of
Counterfeit Blue Jeans Bearing the Jordache Trademark, 601 F. Supp. 476, 481
(W.D.N.C. 1985). Of course, the trademark owner gets the first stab during the thirtyday consent period. See supratext accompanying notes 113-15. For example, when the
CBP seized more than $16 million in counterfeit Nike shoes in 2006, CBP officials told
reporters that "depending on what Nike would like to do with the shoes .... they will
either be destroyed, sent to correctional facilities for prisoner use or be used as relief
items in a natural disaster." Alexis Huicochea, U.S. Authorities Intercept Huge
Counterfeit-Shoe Load: 6 People Are Indicted; Part of the Shipment Was Routed to
Arizona, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.azstarnet.com/metro/ 145367.php.
For other examples, see Letter from W. Ralph Basham, Comm'r, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., & Julie L. Meyers, Assistant Sec'y, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Rev. Emmanuel
Ohonme,
President,
Samaritan's
Feet
(Jan.
24,
2008),
available at
http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/messages/footware-donation-article.xml
(noting the trademark owner's consent to the donation of 10,000 pairs of shoes to
Samaritan's Feet charity); Press Release, U.S. Customs Serv., Customs Makes
Donations to Local Non-Profit
Entities (Dec.
24,
1998), available at
http://customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/1998/ 1224-O0.htm (explaining that Jeep and other
trademark owners consent to donation of clothing and toys, which local Customs
employees de-trademarked during volunteer time, to various charities); Press Release,
U.S. Customs Serv., U.S. Customs Donates Seized Caps to "Toys for Tots" (Apr. 23,
1998), available at http://www.customs.govlhot-new/pressrel/1998/0423-OO.htm (stating
that Nike consented to the donation of baseball caps to Toys for Tots charity); Press
Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Donates Seized Toys to Montana Toys for Tots (Mar. 27, 2007),
available
at
http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/newsreleases/archives/20O7-newsreleases/032007/03272007.xml (noting Motorola's consent to the donation of counterfeit
action figures to Toys for Tots charity).
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Emergency Authority

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the CBP skirted its normal
duties when it distributed seized counterfeit goods in their original,
trademark-infringing state without first obtaining the trademark
owners' consent. 12 3 While making donations in Jackson, Mississippi,
a CBP official explained to reporters that under normal
circumstances, the counterfeit items would have been destroyed; but
"[u]nder statuatory [sic] authority during these times of disaster our
commissioner has the authority to waive that, in other words we don't
have to go back to the trademark and say, can we have that, our
commissioner can do that unilatterally [sic] during these times of
difficulty. ''124 The CBP claimed this authority pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1318(b)(2), 125 which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commissioner of
Customs, when necessary to respond to a specific threat to human life
or national interests, is authorized to close temporarily any Customs
office or port of entry or take any other lesser action that may be
126
necessary to respond to the specific threat.

CBP officials asserted that this emergency statute is triggered
"when the [P]resident declares a state of emergency, as President
Bush did for Hurricane Katrina.' 1 27 The President initially made an
"emergeny declaration" for certain areas of Louisiana on August 27,
2005, authorizing emergency FEMA assistance pursuant to the
Stafford Act. 128 Over the next few days, the President made similar
declarations for areas of both Mississippi and Alabama. 129 The
President later made a formal proclamation of "National Emergency"
as authorized by 50 U.S.C. § 1621,130 suspending provisions of the

123.
See Scafidi, supranote 9.
124.
U.S. Customs Donates Seized Clothing, WBLT NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.wlbt.com/Global]story.asp?S=3840452&nav=2CSfeRD6
(quoting Thomas
Winkowski, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
125.
Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 4.
126.
19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) (2009).
127.
Seper, supra note 24 (paraphrasing Judy Turner, CBP Spokeswoman); see
also Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., CBP
Support of Katrina Recovery Effort Continues (Sept. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news-releases/archives/2005 press-releases/092
005/09082005.xml ("Also pursuant to 19 USC 1318(b)(2), CBP is responding to the
national emergency by issuing out forfeited clothing to victims of the hurricane.").
128.
Notice of Declaration No. FEMA-3212-EM, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,238 (Sept. 7,
2005).
129.
Talking
Points
Memo,
TPM
Hurricane
Katrina
Timeline,
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/katrina-timeline.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
130.
50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2009).
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Davis-Beacon Act, which pertains to wage rate requirements for those
131
mechanics and laborers employed under government contracts.

III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

A. Under TRIPS
The CBP's Katrina donations present a question as to the
legality of government donations of seized counterfeit goods under
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. In January of 2008, the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body provided its answer to this question. 132
Evaluating the similar Chinese Customs policy of donating seized
counterfeit goods to Red Cross relief efforts, the WTO review panel
determined that the Chinese donations policy was not inconsistent
with TRIPS obligations. 133 Because the Chinese donations to Red
Cross relief efforts so closely mirrored the CBP's Katrina donations,
the Panel's ruling on China's donations policies provides insight into
how the WTO might analyze the U.S. donations under the TRIPS
Agreement.
i.

The WTO Panel Report

In its formal request for the establishment of a WTO review
panel, the U.S. claimed that China's border measures did not provide
Chinese Customs the authority to order destruction or disposal in
accordance with the principles of TRIPS Article 46.134 As Article 59
incorporates the principles of Article 46, the U.S. argued that the
measures were thus inconsistent with China's obligations under
Article 59.135 Specifically with regard to the donation option, the U.S.
argued that Customs' donation of seized goods to "public welfare

131.
Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 13, 2005).
132.
See IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, pt. VII.B.2(c)(vii)
(considering the legality of China's donations "to social welfare bodies").
133.
See id. para. 7.309.
[A]uthority to donate to another social welfare body does not preclude authority
to donate to the Red Cross. Therefore, to the extent that Customs' authority to
donate to the Red Cross Society of China conforms to the principles set out in
Article 46, Customs has the authority to order disposal specified by Article 59.

Id.
134.
Request for the Establishment of the Panel by the United States, ChinaMeasures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual PropertyRights, § II,
WT/DS362/7 (Aug. 13, 2007), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN highLight
Parent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS362%FC%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2
FDDFDOCUMENTS%2]FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F362%2D7%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3
6&popTitle=WT%2FDS362%2F7.
135.
Id.
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organizations" under the measures adopted did not "provide Customs
with the authority to dispose of the confiscated goods 'outside the
channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused
to the right holder,"' as mandated by the first sentence of Article
46.136 The U.S. argument was not a per se condemnation of the
donation of counterfeit goods, but instead questioned the legal
structure of the measures because they did not provide Customs the
discretion to determine that donation was inappropriate where
137
circumstances indicated potential harm to the right holder.
Assuming that the donations constituted disposal "outside the
channels of commerce" in accordance with the Article 46 principle,
the U.S. listed several situations in which donations could harm the
right holder. 138 First, if the goods turned out to be defective or
dangerous, the donations could subject right holders to unwarranted
claims for defects. 139
Even if the Chinese policies conditioned
donation on a determination of suitability for public welfare purposes
(which may eliminate defective or dangerous goods), the U.S.
predicted that this condition would not prevent the donation of usable
but lower-quality counterfeit products that could nonetheless harm
the right holder's reputation. 140 Lastly, the U.S. argued that "nothing
appears to prevent public welfare organizations from selling the
infringing goods they receive [through donation], thus moving these

136.
Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States,
China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, para. 49, WTJDS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
137.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, paras. 7.287, 7.289. The legal
structure of the Chinese border measures, the U.S. argued, set out a "hierarchy of
requirements" for the disposition of infringing goods seized at the border and thus did
not provide Chinese Customs the authority to order destruction or disposal in
accordance with the principles of TRIPS Article 46. Request for the Establishment of
the Panel by the United States, supra note 134, § II. Under the first step of this
"compulsory hierarchy," once Customs determines that goods are infringing, it must
ascertain whether the goods may be used for the "public good." Executive Summary of
the Oral Statement of the United States at the First Substantive Meeting, supra note
100, paras. 18-19; Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United
States, supra note 136, para. 52. If so, Customs donates the goods to a "public welfare
organization," or instead may allow the trademark owner to purchase the goods.
Executive Summary of the Oral Statement of the United States at the First
Substantive Meeting, supra note 100, para. 19; Executive Summary of the First
Written Submission of the United States, supra note 136, para. 52. The U.S. argued
that neither of these first step options satisfied the principles set out in Article 46.
Executive Summary of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States, ChinaMeasures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
para. 49, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
138.
First Submission of the United States, China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, para. 185-86, WTJDS362
(Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.govwebfmsend230.
139.
Id. para. 186.
140.
Executive Summary of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States, supra
note 137, para. 49.
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goods back into commerce." 141 The Panel evaluated each of these
14 2
arguments individually.
a.

Defective Goods

The Panel first evaluated the argument that where the goods
seized were defective or dangerous, the Chinese border measures still
required that the goods be donated. 14 3 The U.S. presented no
evidence to show that Chinese Customs actually donated defective,
144
dangerous, or even sub-standard goods to charity organizations.
The Panel noted that, to the contrary, Chinese Customs measures
conditioned the availability of the donation option on a finding that
145
the goods could be used for "social public welfare undertakings."'
The Panel determined that this condition provided Customs a means
of keeping defective and dangerous goods from being donated, and the
U.S. had provided no evidence to contradict such a conclusion. 146 As
such, the Panel found that the U.S. failed to demonstrate that
Chinese Customs "lack[ed] authority to donate goods to social welfare
bodies in such a manner as to avoid any harm to the right holder
caused by defective or dangerous goods.' 47
b.

Harm to Reputation

The Panel next considered the argument that donations
consisting of safe, yet lower-quality counterfeit goods could still harm
the right holder's reputation. 148 The Panel referred back to its
previous discussion of China's argument that the Article 46 principle
requiring that the manner of disposal "avoid" harm merely obligated
Customs to "pay due regard to" the potential interests of right
holders. 149
The Panel rejected China's interpretation, instead

141.
Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States,
supra note 136, para. 186.
142.
See IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, § VII.B.2(c)(vii), paras.
7.286-7.324. (considering each argument in turn).
143.
Id. para. 7.289.
144.
Id. The U.S. did submit one newspaper article documenting a case of
exploding cell phone batteries manufactured in China, but the Panel disregarded the
article as irrelevant, as it contained no information linking the batteries to Customs
donations. Id.
145.
Id. para. 7.290.
146.
Id. para. 7.291.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. pt. VII.B.2(c)(vii), paras. 7.286-7.324.
149.
Id. para. 7.281; see also Executive Summary of the First Written
Submission of China, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, para. 41, WT[DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (arguing that
"Customs has the authority to dispose of the infringing goods outside the open market
while paying due regard to [the] interests of the right holders").
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defining "avoid" as "keep off, prevent; obviate." 150 Furthermore, the
Panel noted, the principle requires the method of disposal to avoid
"any harm," as opposed to simply "harm" or "some harm."1 5 1 As such,
the Panel found that "the manner of disposal must be designed in
1 52
such a way as to prevent any harm occurring to the right holder."'
However, the Panel then limited this finding by recalling that
disposal outside the channels of commerce is an alternative to
destruction under TRIPS. 153 The fact that the negotiators of TRIPS
did not prescribe a per se destruction rule thus implied to the Panel
that "any inherent risk of harm due simply to the fact that the goods
have not been completely destroyed is insufficient to disqualify a
disposal method, as it would nullify the choice between disposal and
destruction."' 54 In contrast, "more specific concerns linked to harm
caused to the right holder" would remain a relevant consideration in
the determination of this Article 46 principle. 155 In its subsequent
evaluation of the reputational harm caused by China's donations
156
policy, the Panel sought "evidence of actual harm" for this showing.
The Panel stressed that harm to the right holder through
disposal of goods outside the channels of commerce depends on the
circumstances of disposal. 157 In normal circumstances, the Panel
acknowledged that counterfeit goods with "the trademark unlawfully
158
affixed" (i.e., prior to de-trademarking) present a risk of confusion.
The infringing mark may mislead consumers as to the origin of the
goods, potentially resulting in lost sales or harm to the right holder's
159
reputation in cases involving goods of sub-standard quality.
Customs authorities may take steps to avoid these risks, such as detrademarking the goods, affixing charitable endorsements on the
goods, 160 or exerting control over the use of the goods or the
161
distribution methods.

150.

IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.281.

151.

Id.

152.
Id. (emphasis added). As the U.S. argued, "[tlhe obligation is not to 'pay due
regard' to the interests of a right holder and to tolerate intermittent or 'non-significant'
harm. The standard requires avoiding any harm to the right holder." Executive
Summary of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States, supra note 137, para. 44.
153. IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.282.
154.

Id.

155.
Id.
156.
See id. para. 7.295 C'[E]vidence of actual harm caused to the right holder by
the manner of disposal could be relevant in assessing whether the manner of disposal
conforms to this principle.").
157.
Id. para 7.284.
158.

Id.

159.
Id. paras. 7.284,7.296.
160.
China presented evidence that Customs had employed this practice for past
donations. See id. para. 7.296 (providing an example where the Chinese Red Cross
imprinted its seal on donated counterfeit clothing before distribution).
161.
Id. para. 7.284.
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Nonetheless, after comparing the first and final sentences of
Article 46, the Panel concluded that de-trademarking was not
necessarily required in this situation. 16 2 The distinction rested in the
Panel's finding that the first sentence of Article 46 (requiring only
that the disposal method "avoid any harm caused to the right holder")
pertains to disposal "outside the channels of commerce," while the
last sentence of Article 46 ("the general rule" that simply detrademarking the counterfeit goods is insufficient 163) pertains to the
'164
release of counterfeit goods "into the channels of commerce.
Because the Panel considered donations to charities, whether the
goods were meant for the charities' own use or for charitable
distribution, to be a method of disposal occurring outside the
channels of commerce, 165 the Panel found the general rule of Article
1 66
46's last sentence inapplicable.
The Panel therefore did not "assume[] that the removal of the
167
trademark [was] required (or insufficient)" for the donation option.
Consent of the right holder, while valuable for this assessment (and
recommended by the U.S. as a prerequisite to donation168 ), was
similarly not required by the Panel. 169 If the determination of harm
did not look to the circumstances of the disposal, the Panel noted that
"any disposal outside the channels of commerce where persons could
simply observe a counterfeit trademark would be presumed to cause
harm to the right holder. This result is not contemplated by the
terms of Article 46, as the possibility of observing the counterfeit
trademark is incidental to the requisite authority not to destroy the

162.
Id. para. 7.283.
163.
See supra text accompanying note 91 (describing "the general rule").
164.
See IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.283 (contrasting the
first and fourth sentences of Article 46 and discussing the significance of the
differences between the two).
165.
See id. para. 7.279 (stating that the principle applying to disposal outside
the channels of commerce indisputably applies to donations to charities "for their own
use or for charitable distribution").
166.
See id. para. 7.283 (asserting that the last sentence references release into
the channels of commerce, and that when goods are disposed of outside the channels of
commerce trademark removal is not necessarily required).
167.
Id.
168.
See id. para. 7.284 n.266 (presenting the United States' claim that
obtaining the right holder's consent "avoids any harm to the right holder"); Executive
Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States, supra note 136, para.
53.
Where a donation to a charity is an option, and the donation has the rightholder's consent, this may be a socially beneficial disposition of infringing goods
that also observes the principles of Article 46. On the other hand, allowing
counterfeit goods to be used, even for 'public good,' can be harmful to a right
holder in certain cases.

Id.
169.

IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.284.
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goods.' 170 Accordingly, the failure of China's customs measures to
require de-trademarking of donated counterfeit goods was not a
171
conclusive factor in the Panel's decision.
Notwithstanding the harms caused to right holders in ordinary
circumstances, the Panel found no evidence of harm in this case,
emphasizing that "goods donated by Customs to the Red Cross are
not distributed in ordinary circumstances.' 1 72
Specifically, the
purpose and procedures of the Red Cross bore on the "manner" of
disposal:
The Red Cross distributes donated goods itself, outside the channels of
commerce, including in disaster relief projects, where it cannot simply
be assumed that the recipients are misled as to the origin of the
goods. 1 7 3 The recipients do not choose the goods in the way that
ordinary consumers do, nor can it be assumed that the recipients are
1 74
potential consumers of the genuine goods.

Consequently, the Panel found no evidence "that any harm has ever
been caused, or is likely to be caused, to right holders' reputations" as
175
a result of the donations.
c.

Later Sales of Donated Goods

Lastly, the Panel addressed the concern that donation may
result in later sale of the counterfeit goods. 176 China argued that
under the adopted measures, Customs had a legal obligation to
ensure that donated goods did not re-enter the channels of
commerce. 177
As evidence of Customs' supervision of previous
donations, China submitted a "Memorandum of Cooperation," which
Customs had entered into with the Red Cross Society of China
pursuant to previous donations. 178 The U.S. argued in response that
preventive measures did not demonstrate that the goods could not
179
return to commerce.

170.
Id.
171.
See id. paras. 7.296-7.297 ('The Panel has taken due note that nothing in
the measures at issue obliges Customs or the social welfare bodies to remove
counterfeit trademarks.").
172.
Id. para. 7.297.
173.
In a footnote, the Panel acknowledged evidence provided by China that the
Red Cross delivers donated goods in its own packaging. Id. para. 7.297 n.276.
174.
Id. para. 7.297.
175.
Id. The Panel found it relevant that two internationally prominent
trademark owners not only consented to the donations, but "actually participated in
the distribution by the Red Cross of goods that infringed their rights, suggesting that
they [did] not presume donation of infringing goods harms their reputation." Id.
176.
Id. pt. VII.B.2(c)(vii), paras. 7.286-7.324.
177.
Id. paras. 7.300-7.303.
178.
Id. para. 7.300.
179.
Id. para. 7.305.
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Later sale may occur in two situations: the charities might sell
the donated goods in order to raise money for their own charitable
purposes, or charitably distributed goods might "find their way back
into the channels of commerce"1 80 (i.e., the recipients of the charitable
distributions later sell the goods).18 1
In regards to the former
situation, the Panel acknowledged that "the goods are not in fact
disposed of outside the channels of commerce but into the channels of
commerce."18 2 In regards to the latter situation, the Panel said that
the post-donation re-entry of the goods into the channels of commerce
"does not alter the fact that the goods were disposed of outside the
18 3
channels of commerce, in the ordinary sense of 'disposal.'
In either situation, the Panel concluded that Customs authorities
are only obligated "to ensure that the manner in which counterfeit
goods are disposed of outside the channels of commerce is designed in
such a way that it will comply with the principle."18 4 The relevant
focus of the Article 46 principle is on the manner of disposal, not the
actual carrying-out of the disposal.18 5 As such, the Panel reasoned
that Customs authorities should not be "held responsible for acts of
the bodies carrying out the disposal that is beyond the authorized
manner."18 6 Subsequent sales of donations, the Panel explained, are
only relevant to the determination of whether the disposal outside the
channels of commerce was carried out "in such a manner as to avoid
any harm caused to the right holder," not to the determination of
whether the disposal occurred inside or outside the channels of
commerce.1

87

The Panel found that TRIPS merely imposes the duty for
Customs to carry out the necessary supervision of the disposal, which
it accomplished through the use of its memorandum with the Red
Cross.' 8 8 The U.S. pointed out that other charities may not be bound
under the same donation agreement as the Red Cross, thus donations
to charities other than the Red Cross might not be in accordance with
Article 46 principles.' 8 9 However, the Panel responded that this
argument was not convincing, because the U.S. had failed to
demonstrate the possibility that other charities would not also be

180.
181.
its seal on
goods).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. para. 7.279.
See id. para. 7.296 (explaining that the Red Cross's practice of imprinting
counterfeit clothing was meant to prevent the post-distribution sale of the
Id. para. 7.279 (first emphasis added).
Id.
Id. para. 7.280 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. paras. 7.279-7.280.
Id. para. 7.312.
Id. para. 7.308.
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held to requirements similar to those laid out in the Red Cross
donation agreement. 190
d.

Release into the Channels of Commerce

The Panel also evaluated another method of disposal employed
by Chinese Customs: counterfeit goods auctions. 19 1 The resulting
analysis of the Panel establishes a framework for assessing methods
of disposal that release the goods into the channels of commerce
under the last sentence of Article 46 and, therefore, is relevant to the
discussion of donation to the extent that one may argue that donation
constitutes release into the channels of commerce. Because this Note
attempts to make such an argument, 192 a brief explanation of the
Panel's findings will be useful.
First, the Panel determined that although Articles 46 and 59
seemingly authorize only two options for handling counterfeit goods
(i.e., destruction or disposal outside the channels of commerce), the
TRIPS Agreement did not bar resort to other remedies. 193 The
phrasing in both Articles establishes obligations that certain
authorities "shall have the authority" to order destruction or disposal
outside the channels of commerce, but nothing in either Article
indicates that these options must be exclusive. 194
The Panel
explained that the obligation to "have" authority does not require
authorities to exercise that authority in a particular way (unless
otherwise specified). 195 Thus, the auction method is not necessarily
inconsistent with TRIPS, even though it is not one of the two required
196
methods.
However, the Panel noted that the TRIPS negotiators apparently
still thought it necessary to stipulate in both Articles that authorities
must not release "infringing" goods into the channels of commerce. 197
Perhaps the negotiators acknowledged that release of infringing
goods may itself constitute an act of infringement. 198 But where
disposal occurs in non-commercial circumstances or where the goods
are altered such that they are no longer "infringing," there would be

190.
Id. para. 7.309.
191.
Id. pt. VII.B.2(c)(ix), paras. 3.327-7.355.
192.
See infra Part III.A.ii (presenting arguments regarding the application of
TRIPS to the CBP's donations).
193.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.240.
194.
Id.
195.
Id. para. 7.236. The Panel furthermore acknowledged that the obligation
required authority to order destruction or disposal, thus Member countries could
presumably still satisfy the obligation even where measures only provide for the
authority to order one of the two options. Id. para. 7.246.
196.
Id. para. 7.327.
197.
Id. para. 7.242.
198.
Id.
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no infringement.1 99 For these reasons, the Panel theorized, the
negotiators provided for disposal outside the channels (under the first
sentence of Article 46) and set a minimum degree of alteration
required for release into the channels (in the last sentence of Article

46).200
The Panel explained that the auction method of disposal clearly
constitutes release into the channels of commerce. 20 1 This triggers
the application of the Article 46 rule that "the simple removal of the
trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in
exceptional cases. ' 20 2
China's auction measures required detrademarking (i.e., simple removal of the trademark unlawfully
affixed) prior to auctioning counterfeit goods. 20 3 However, China
argued that the measures went beyond "simple removal" because they
also provide the right holder an opportunity to comment before the
auction. 20 4 Thus, the question for the Panel was which actions push
removal of the trademark past the definition of "simple," rendering
20 5
release into commerce an available option.
The Panel explained that removing the counterfeit trademark
would convert the goods to non-infringing goods under the terms of

TRIPS. 20 6 Therefore, by requiring more than "simple removal," the
principle of the last sentence in Article 46 indicates that its purpose
20 7
runs deeper than just the termination of the infringement at issue.
Simply de-trademarking goods destined for the channels of commerce
presents a relatively easy opportunity for the goods to be retrademarked and thus converted back to an infringing state.20 8 For
this reason, the Panel determined, the negotiators intended to "create
an effective deterrent to further infringement," 20 9 including that of
parties other than the original infringer. 2 10 Thus, the Panel held that
"[r]emoval of the trademark is not 'simple' if the state of the goods is

199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
See id. para. 7.327 ("[lit is undisputed that auction is not a form of disposal
outside the channels of commerce.").
202.
See id. para. 7.359-7.362 (quoting the fourth sentence of Article 46 and
concluding that it applies to the auction method of disposal).
203.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.366.
204.
Id. para. 7.368.
205.
See id. paras. 7.370-7.371 (discussing the meaning of "simple removal").
The Panel defined "simple" as 'with nothing added; unqualified; neither more nor less
than; mere, pure."' Id. para. 7.369 (quoting NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1993)).

206.
Id. para. 7.372.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. para. 7.373. The Panel further noted that counterfeit goods are usually
designed to imitate the overall appearance of the genuine good such that even post-detrademarking, the goods may still be so similar that there is a heightened risk that
they will be re-trademarked and sold. Id. para. 7.374.
209.
Id. para. 7.374 (emphasis added).
210.
Id. para. 7.384.
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altered sufficiently to deter further infringement," the state of the
21
goods being the relevant focus. '
As the Chinese Customs measures did not alter the state of the
goods beyond simple de-trademarking, the Panel needed only to
consider whether the "exceptional cases" language of Article 46
applied. 212 In regards to this assessment, the United States argued
that the ordinary meaning of "exceptional" suggested not simply a
small percentage of cases but circumstances that are "unusual or
special. '2 13 The Panel added that the determination of whether a
case is exceptional must be guided by the Article's purpose: "to create
an effective deterrent to infringement. '2 14 Simply focusing on the
number of cases for the determination would suggest a degree of
tolerance for infringement. 2 15 In conclusion, the Panel articulated
that "such cases must be narrowly circumscribed" and application
"must be rare, lest the so-called exception become the rule, or at least
'216
ordinary.
ii.

Application to the CBP's Donations

The findings of the WTO Panel Report described above provide a
clear indication that the same Panel would most likely find
acceptable the donations of U.S. Customs to the Hurricane Katrina
relief effort. 217
However, the WTO Panel may have wrongly
interpreted the principles of Article 46 as applied to charitable
donations of counterfeit goods. First, the donations method could
easily be classified as release into the channels of commerce, which
requires more than simple de-trademarking of the goods.
Additionally, even if donation is considered disposal outside the
channels of commerce as the Panel determined, authorities must still
avoid all harm caused to right holders. By failing to make the

211.
Id. para. 7.375 (citing TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 46). See also id. para.
7.377.
212.
Id. paras. 7.385-7.386.
213.
Id. para. 7.387.
214.
Id. para. 7.391 (quoting TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 46). The example offered
by the Panel involved "an innocent importer who has been deceived into buying a
shipment of counterfeit goods, who has no means of recourse against the exporter and
who has no means of reaffixing counterfeit trademarks to the goods." Id.
215.
Id. para. 7.392.
216.
Id. para. 7.391.
217.
The donations are largely indistinguishable from the Chinese donations.
Just like the Chinese donations, the CBP similarly donated the counterfeit goods to the
Red Cross for use in natural disaster relief without requiring consent of the trademark
holders and without first de-trademarking. The only material difference is that prior to
distribution, the Chinese Red Cross affixed its seal to the counterfeit goods donated.
See id. para. 7.296 ("Whilst the evidence shows that, in one case, the Red Cross
imprinted its seal on a batch of donated infringing clothes, apparently to prevent the
goods being sold after distribution .... ").
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slightest effort to de-trademark the goods or gain consent of the right
holders, the CBP arguably failed in this obligation.
a.

Release into the Channels of Commerce

Government donations of counterfeit goods may reasonably be
interpreted as a "release of the goods into the channels of commerce,"
which would trigger the operation of the last sentence of Article 46.
The donation method fits under the plain reading of "release of the
goods into the channels of commerce." By handing out counterfeits
directly to consumers, the CBP is necessarily injecting those goods
into the channels of commerce. The very presence of these unaltered
goods in the public eye could affect sales for trademark holders, as
consumers of luxury goods may refuse to pay top dollar for goods
associated with "shelter chic. ' 2 18
Donations would thus affect
commerce and bring the method within the purview of the broad
definition
of "commerce" preferred
by the United
States
219
government.
In addition to indirectly affecting commerce, government
donations could reenter the stream of commerce. The International
AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, in its 2005 recommendations to the
United States Trade Representative, pointed out that "[i]t is not
uncommon for counterfeit goods donated to charity ... to reenter the
stream of commerce as they can easily be repurchased by the
' 220
infringers and leave brand owners right back where they started.
Even assuming the original infringer will lose track of the goods,
Article 46 has been interpreted to require deterring "further
infringement" altogether, which encompasses infringement by other
parties. 221
The basis for this interpretation is the reality that
counterfeit goods have an extremely high value in the marketplace,
as designer marks allow for "significant market premium[s].1 222 It is
therefore not unforeseeable that other parties might seek out the
recipients of the donations, perhaps by simply waiting outside
distribution areas (e.g., in this case, the Houston Astrodome), and
attempt to purchase the goods.
Given mounting evidence that

218.

See Scafidi, supra note 9, supp ("Very few corporations have spent millions

in advertising only to be associated with 'shelter chic."').
219.
See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (discussing changes throughout history in the definition
of commerce under the Commerce Clause).
220.
Submission of the InternationalAntiCounterfeiting Coalition, Inc. to the
United States Trade Representative: Special 301 Recommendations, 2005 INT'L
ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION 30 (2005), available at http://www.iacc.org/resources/
2005_USTR_- Special_301.pdf.
221.
See supra text accompanying notes 207-09 (discussing the Panel's
conclusion that the negotiators or TRIPS were concerned with further infringement).
222.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.382.
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common street gangs are becoming increasingly involved in
counterfeit sales, 223 this is particularly conceivable.
The possibility that donation recipients might sell the goods
(either to infringers or to consumers directly) purely by their own
volition is also foreseeable. The donation of counterfeit goods, in their
infringing state, to victims of natural disasters places highly valuable
goods in the hands of people who have lost many, if not all, of their
possessions.
Under these circumstances, it would almost be
unreasonable for the recipients not to attempt to sell them for their
highest market value. Groups like the Red Cross have proven
2 24
incapable of preventing recipient misuse of government donations.
Nor, frankly, should they be burdened with that responsibility.
If CBP donations are characterized as a release into the channels
of commerce, TRIPS would absolutely require de-trademarking prior
to donation. 225 Still, de-trademarking may not render the donations
consistent with TRIPS. Customs would be obligated to sufficiently
alter the goods beyond simple de-trademarking to effectively deter
further infringement. 226 Unless the case is exceptional, this may
require alteration such that the overall appearance of the good does
2 27
not closely resemble the genuine good.
The U.S. may argue that the CBP's Katrina donations fall under
the provision allowing donation after simple de-trademarking for
exceptional cases.
But under the circumstances, they almost
certainly would not. The CBP invoked the authority to make the
donations under an emergency statute, which allows for Customs to
waive certain duties once the President deems the situation an
emergency or disaster. 228 However, these "state of emergency" cases
occur often in the United States. For Hurricane Katrina relief
specifically, the President extended the emergency characterization a

223.
Counterfeit Goods, Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists:Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2005)
(statement of Kris Buckner, President, Investigative Consultants).
224.
See, e.g., Storm-Relief Money Spent at Strip Clubs: Police in Houston Find
Misuse of FEMA's $2000 Debit Cards, WORLD NET DAiLY, Sept. 16, 2005,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.printable&pageId=32377 (reporting
use of debit cards distributed by FEMA and the Red Cross at gentlemen's clubs and
luxury stores).
225.
See TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 46 ("In regard to counterfeit trademark
goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient,
other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of the goods into the channels of
commerce.").
226.
See supra text accompanying note 211 (discussing what constitutes
sufficient alteration of counterfeit goods).
227.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.374.
228.
See supra Part II.B.iii (discussing the CBP's actions in responding to
Hurricane Katrina under the relevant emergency statute).

1692

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1663

full year after the event. 229 In fact, the Declaration of National
Emergency pertaining to the threat of terrorism has been
continuously extended from September of 2001 until today. 230 The
United States is, in effect, under a continuous "state of emergency."
Such "emergency" cases cannot be "narrowly circumscribed," and thus
should not trigger the exception to the general rule set out in the last
sentence of Article 46.231 CBP donations invoking the "exceptional
exception in danger of
cases" clause of Article 46 put the so-called
23 2
becoming "the rule, or at least ordinary."
b.

Disposal Outside the Channels of Commerce

Even under the Panel's interpretation, which renders donations
a method of disposal outside the channels of commerce, the CBP
nonetheless failed in its obligations under the first sentence of Article
46. As explained by the Panel, disposal outside the channel of
commerce must be accomplished in a manner that avoids any harm to
the right holder, not simply one that pays "due regard to" the
interests of right holders. 233 The Panel considered the "possibility of
observing the trademark incidental to the requisite authority not to
destroy the goods," 234 but this clearly is not the case. Where goods
are not destroyed, de-trademarking will most likely be feasible, and
where it is not feasible, other methods of obscuring the trademark
(e.g., affixing charitable endorsements over the mark) may be
appropriate. In any case, the possibility of the public observing the
counterfeit trademark is certainly not "incidental" to non-destruction.
The obligation to prevent any harm to the right holder mandates
that Customs comply with the minimum alteration requirement prior
to the distribution of counterfeit goods.2 35 Where the infringing
trademark is left unaltered, the donated goods will forever be
associated with the trademark owner. Although the WTO Panel

229.
See Amendment to Notices of Emergency Declarations, 71 Fed. Reg. 60,554
(Oct. 13, 2006) (officially closing the Hurricane Katrina emergency period).
230.
Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist
Attacks, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,211 (Aug. 28, 2008) (extending national emergency status for
an additional year).
See supra Part III.A.i (discussing what constitutes an "exceptional case").
231.
See IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.391 ("Even when
232.
narrowly circumscribed, application of the relevant provision must be rare, lest the socalled exception become the rule, or at least ordinary.").
233.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-51 (interpreting the avoidance of
harm requirement).
234.
IP Measures Panel Report, supra note 86, para. 7.284.
235.
It is important to note that the WTO Panel did not mandate that Customs
comply with the minimum alteration requirement prior to the distribution of
counterfeit goods. See id. para. 7.284 ("Practical requirements, such as removal of the
trademark, affixation of a charitable endorsement or controls over the use of goods or
distribution methods, may avoid confusion.").

20091

"SHELTER CHIC' CAN THE U.5. MAKE IT WORK?

1693

determined that China's suitability condition was sufficient to
prevent potentially dangerous or defective goods from being donated,
there is no guarantee that such conditions will filter out every
dangerous or defective good. This renders the trademark owner
vulnerable to any product liability suits resulting from government
236
donations.
The additional harm to the right holder's reputation associated
with donation, remote as it may have seemed to the WTO Panel, is
not unforeseeable.
Even where the recipients of the goods
understand that the goods are not linked to the genuine source, the
fact that consumers will see the goods worn by the recipients with
their infringing marks intact is likely to cause confusion. 23 7 Where
the counterfeit goods are of lower quality than their legitimate
counterparts, this harms the reputation of the trademark owner with
238
potential customers.
Yet even where the quality is satisfactory, the potential for harm
still exists. Circulation of counterfeit items to charitable institutions
may make the goods less desirable to luxury consumers, regardless of
the quality of the counterfeit items. The value of luxury goods is not
239
simply in their quality, but also in their nature as status symbols.
A consumer who spends $1,500 on a designer handbag, for example,
is making an investment in a status symbol. The consumer makes
this purchase with the expectation that it will reflect positively on her
perceived level of taste.240 This requires a certain level of trust that

236.
Although most claims will most likely be dismissed, the trademark owner
will nevertheless sustain legal costs for each product liability claim arising from
government donations. See Blakeny, supra note 36, para. 1.14.
237.
Traditional trademark law requires plaintiffs to show the "likelihood of
confusion among consumers" as to the source of a good for a successful trademark
infringement claim. HERBERT HOVENCAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, 1 IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY LAW § 2.4cl (Supp. 2008). Here, the likelihood of confusion is significant
because many consumers cannot tell the difference between counterfeit and authentic
luxury goods. See DAVENPORT LYONS, COUNTERFEITING LUXURY: EXPOSING THE MYTHS

13 (2d ed. June 2007) ("Many consumers are being duped: 31% of fake buyers have
bought a counterfeit item, thinking that it was the real thing. In fact, only 17% of
consumers are confident that they can tell the difference between a counterfeit and the
genuine item.").
238.
See supra Part II.A (describing the costs of counterfeits to the trademark
holder).
239.
See JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, LIVING IN THE AGE OF
ENTITLEMENT: THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC 160 (2009) (explaining that consumers today

desire products that "confer status and importance").
240.
See supra note 42 (explaining that consumers want their purchases to
convey a "desirable image or lifestyle").
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the brand will maintain its strength and exclusivity (and thus, that
24 1
the handbag will maintain its status level for years to come).
To build that level of trust, luxury brands strive to maintain
strict control over the distribution of their products, limiting
authorized retailers to well-respected boutiques, luxury department
stores, and other exclusive dealers. 242 But when counterfeit versions
of their products exist, brands have very little control over the
channels of distribution of products bearing their name. Where
counterfeit circulation is pervasive, "even the real McCoy looks
fake," 243 thus decreasing its value as a desirable status symbol and
244
consequently resulting in a loss of sales to the trademark owner.
Luxury consumers are suddenly much less willing to spend $1,500
per handbag after they see tourists buying handbags with the same
labels out of plastic garbage bags on Canal Street, 245 and they are
likely to have the same reaction after seeing the handbags distributed
to hurricane victims on the evening news.
Under the circumstances of the Hurricane Katrina donations,
the CBP could have taken various steps to avoid harm to the affected
trademark owners. De-trademarking and other options, such as
affixation of Red Cross endorsement stamps, would have significantly
reduced the likelihood that the goods distributed would be associated
with the affected trademark owner. These alteration efforts could
have been accomplished through a contract with the Red Cross or
even voluntary efforts of CBP employees. 246 Because these options
were likely feasible, the CBP breached its obligation to avoid harm to

241.
This reflects reasonable consumer behavior. In making a significant
purchase, the consumer's belief in the sustainability of the brand's image allows her to
spend money with the confidence that she is making a sound investment.
242.

See MARY GEHLHAR, THE FASHION DESIGNER'S SURVIVAL GUIDE: START AND

RUN YOUR OWN FASHION BUSINESS 170-71 (2008) (advising new luxury brands to limit
the distribution of their products); Jonathan S. Vickers & Franck Renand, The
Marketing of Luxury Goods: An Exploratory Study-Three Conceptual Dimensions, 3
MARKETING REV. 459, 474 (2003) (explaining that in order to increase demand for its
products, a luxury brand should carefully manage its "marketing communication mix";
marketing endeavors should "articulate a mix of symbolic images ... in a creative, but
consistent and congruent way").
243.
Skenazy, supra note 72. As Ms. Skenazy asserts, "I see a lady with a
Hermes scarf, and unless it's [a celebrity], I just assume she got it for 10 bucks." Id.
244.
See From Runway to Highway Robbery, http://fashionip.blogspot.com2008/
04/where-is-harm-in-counterfeit-fashion.html (Apr. 15, 2008, 08:26 EST) (discussing
various consequences of counterfeit circulation).
245.
See id. (noting that counterfeit handbags are commonly sold out of black
plastic garbage bags on Canal Street). The argument that consumers could easily be
turned off by such an experience is bolstered by the reality that the value of luxury
goods depends on a delicate balance of social cues. See Vickers & Renand, supra note
242, at 473 ("[T]he primary value of luxury goods is psychological, and their
consumption is dependent on a distinctive mix of social and individual cues.").
246.
See Press Release, U.S. Customs Serv., Customs Makes Donations to Local
Non-Profit Entities, supra note 122 (describing an instance where CBP employees
volunteered their time to de-trademark donated toys).
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the right holders under the first sentence of Article 46 of the TRIPS
Agreement.

B. Under U.S. Law
The CBP's donations may not have been authorized under U.S.
law. It is first worth mentioning that at the time the CBP distributed
the donations, the President had not yet formally declared a
"National Emergency," 24 7 which is arguably required to trigger the
248
statute authorizing emergency actions by Customs officials.
President Bush finally made such a proclamation on September 8,
2005.249 However, this proclamation only suspended provisions of the
Davis-Beacon Act, which pertains to wage rate requirements for those
250
mechanics and laborers employed under government contracts.
This did not clearly authorize the CBP's donations.
Admittedly, a "National Emergency" proclamation may not have
been required under 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) (i.e., the statute invoked
by the CBP) as it is required under the preceding subsection, 19
U.S.C. § 1318(b)(1). 2 5 1
However, even assuming the relevant
provision does not require a formal proclamation of "National
Emergency" to trigger the authority, 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) does not
clearly authorize the type of action the CBP employed in making the
Katrina donations. The statute authorizes the Commissioner of
Customs, "when necessary to respond to a specific threat to human
life or national interests," to "close temporarily any Customs office or

247.
See Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 13, 2005)
(documenting the proclamation, which occurred on Sept. 8, 2005). Interestingly enough,
the CBO made the statement invoking the emergency statute a few days prior to the
president's proclamation. See Seper, supra note 24 (referring to statements made by
the CBO on September 6, 2005, two days prior to the official presidential
proclamation).
248.
See supra Part II.B.iii (providing a discussion of how to trigger the statute
authorizing emergency actions by Customs officials).
249.
Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 13, 2005).
250.
Id.
251.
Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) (2009)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commissioner of Customs,
when necessary to respond to a specific threat to human life or national
interests, is authorized to close temporarily any Customs office or port of entry
or take any other lesser action that may be necessary to respond to the specific
threat.
with § 1318(b)(1)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury,
when necessary to respond to a national emergency declared under the
National Emergencies Act ... or to a specific threat to human life or national
interests, is authorized to . . . [e]liminate, consolidate, or relocate any office or
port of entry of the Customs Service.
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port of entry or take any other lesser action that may be necessary to
respond to the specific threat. '252
Arguably, the donation of
counterfeit goods in this case did not respond to a specific threat to
human life or national interests. An extra set of clothing, although
much appreciated, may not be necessary to maintain a human life.
And the threat, as explained above, had not yet been extended to the
'2 53
level of "national interests.
Additionally, there is no indication that the CBP's response in
these circumstances was the type of action contemplated by the
legislature in drafting this statute. There appears to be no evidence
that this statute has ever been invoked in this manner. 254 In fact, the
statute was additionally invoked to create ad hoc Customs policies for
more efficient international assistance, by way of allowing the release
255
of embargoed safeguard goods for donation to Katrina relief efforts.
Given that embargoed goods are in many aspects different from
counterfeit goods previously seized by Customs, 256 the CBP's use of
the same provision for two substantively distinct actions suggests
that one of the two actions is not in fact authorized by the statute.

IV.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS: SENDING MIXED SIGNALS

In addition to their questionable legality, the CBP's actions may
have also undercut the U.S. position as the champion of IP rights
enforcement. 25 7 The U.S. has built its strong pro-IP reputation in
part by "exerting political pressure against nations that make
knockoffs, demanding raids on factories and warehouses, and

252.
§ 1318(b)(2).
253.
See § 1318(b) (requiring that the threat reach the level of "national
interests" before a state of emergency can be declared).
254.
The Author found no case in which the CBP invoked this statute in order to
make donations of infringing goods and avoid statutory duties to rights holders.
255.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Vera Adams, Executive Dir., Trade
Compliance & Facilitation Office of Field Operations, to Customs & Border Prot.'s
Directors of Field Operations 2 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/trade/priority-tradetextilestbtsTBT2005/tbt05024O1.ctt/tbt050
24_01.doc (providing for such policies governing "embargoed China safeguard
merchandise" and stating that § 1318(b) "allow[s] for the importation of merchandise
for humanitarian purposes without entry and without payment of duty, taxes, or fees");
cf. U.S. Quiet on Lowering Duties for Hurricane Relief Materials, INSIDE U.S. TRADE.,
Sept. 16, 2005, at 1 (explaining that the Bush Administration could pursue this option
in order to lower "tariffs and trade remedy duties on imports of lumber, cement and
steel in order to ensure U.S. supplies of these materials are available to help with
reconstruction efforts in areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina").
256.
See Valentin Povarchuk, Jurisdiction to Challenge Seizure and Destruction
of Counterfeit Merchandise, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 554, 558 (2008) (discussing
counterfeit goods and arguing that their "seizure ... does not constitute an embargo").
257.
See Scafidi, supra note 9, supp. (arguing that the donation policy
"undercut[] the U.S. position on IP protection").
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applauding the mass destruction of seized goods. '258
In 2008,
President George W. Bush signed the PRO-IP Act into law, which
increased penalties for counterfeiting, granted state and local law
enforcement programs up to $25 million annually to help develop
anticounterfeiting teams within the next five years, and provided for
the appointment of a White House IP coordinator. 259
The
Department of Justice has also made anticounterfeiting "a major law
enforcement priority. '260 Yet faced with the devastation of Hurricane
Katrina and the stiff criticism of the Bush Administration's response
to the tragedy, 261 the federal government abandoned its hard-line
262
stance and shamelessly doled out counterfeits to its citizens.
Unfortunately, these messages translate to both U.S. citizens and the
global community.
Failing to maintain a consistent stance on IP enforcement could
mean major consequences for the U.S. government. Professor Jeremy
Phillips explains that by making light of IP rights infringement,
national governments invite certain undesirable consequences:
"embarrassing public criticism for failure to protect against . . .
legitimate commercial interests, including not merely those of
intellectual property owners but the distribution, wholesale, and
retail channels through which legitimate goods are placed before the
consumer; ''the tolerance of a criminal culture in which organized
crime and money-laundering thrive;" and "the risk of the government
of another country initiating a complaint procedure with the World
Trade Organization. 2 6 3
A. The Message to U.S. Citizens
The government's donation of seized counterfeit goods sends
mixed messages to its citizenry.
In its condemnation of
counterfeiting, the federal government has practically characterized
264
buying a knock-off as an act of aiding and abetting terrorists.

258.
Id.
259.
Dana Thomas, The Fight Against Fakes, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Jan. 2009, at
69, 72.
260.
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks
at a Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual Property Rights Initiative (July 23,
1999) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/dagipini.htm).
261.
Gorman, supra note 2.
262.
See Scafidi, supra note 9, supp. (describing the federal government's retreat
from its hard-line stance on counterfeit products in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).
263.
Phillips, supra note 42, para. 29.20.
264.
See, e.g., Thomas, If You Buy One of These Fake Bags, You Are Supporting
Child Labor, Organized Crime, Even Terrorism ..... supra note 21, at 66 ("Sales of
fake goods on the streets of New York are thought by some U.S. intelligence agencies to
have partially financed the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and may have
even contributed to the September 11 attacks.").
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Consumers are understandably skeptical of this view. 265 It is difficult
to believe that counterfeit designer goods pose a serious threat to
national security, especially when "the government is handing out
'266
fakes for free.
Despite the mixed signals sent by the CBP's donations in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, the government surprisingly transformed
the matter into a positive public relations opportunity.
In a
statement to reporters, one CBP official characterized the donations
as "a humanitarian effort on the government's part. '267 The White
House even listed the donations in its report entitled The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned under the heading
"What Went Right. '268 As Professor Susan Scafidi explains, this
confusing strategy of "seizing with one hand and redistributing with
the other" 269 may have nevertheless triggered a "setback to the
public's already tenuous belief in the evils of counterfeit goods. '2 70
B. The Global Message
These mixed signals resonate on a global level as well. 271
Professor Scafidi compares the CBP's donations to the Bush
Administration's similar policy change during the 2001 anthrax
bioterrorism attacks. 272 Prior to that time, the U.S. had taken a
hard-line stance in protecting drug patents. 273 Arguing that drug
companies need to be assured of the money from patents to advance
research for new products, the U.S. planned to file a complaint
against Brazil for allowing the production of generic AIDS treatment
drugs. 274
The U.S. even condemned proposed South African
legislation permitting the alternative production of patented drugs in
27 5
times of national emergency.
When faced with threats of bioterrorism, however, the U.S.
deviated slightly from its hard-line approach. Fearing an anthrax
outbreak, the government considered invoking national emergency
authority to overturn Bayer's patent on ciprofloxacin (an agent used

265.
See Scafidi, supra note 9, supp. ("Still, it's hard to believe that buying a pair
of faux sunglasses is an act of terrorism.").
266.
Id.
267.
Gorman, supra note 2.
268.
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED app. B, at 130 (2006).
269.
Counterfeit Chic, Year in Review I: Katrina and Counterfeits, supra note
12.
270.
Scafidi, supra note 9, supp.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.
273.
Emma Clark, America's Anthrax Patent Dilemma, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23,
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1613410.stm.
274.
Id.
275.
Id.
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to treat anthrax inhalation).2 76 These deliberations quickly prompted
criticism from interest groups that had previously campaigned for
generic anti-AIDS drugs. Sophia Tickell, a senior policy advisor at
Oxfam, argued: 'If the U.S. government decides to do this, it would
stand accused of hypocrisy, or at least double standards ....
You
can't apply one thing to developing countries and then when you find
' 27 7
you have your own problems, become willing to waive the rules.'
The U.S. policy choice implicitly "devalue[d] other nations' suffering
'278
in comparison to [its] own.
More recently, the U.S. government sent an indisputably mixed
signal to the international community when it formally requested
that the WTO condemn China's policies for the donation of seized
counterfeit goods. 279 As discussed previously, these donations closely
resembled the CBP's Katrina donations. 28 0 In contrast to the U.S.
donations, however, there was evidence that in one case the Chinese
Red Cross took the additional step of imprinting its seal on
counterfeit clothing prior to distribution to prevent recipients from
later selling the clothes. 28 i Even despite this modification, the U.S.
maintained that charitable donations of counterfeit goods could only
be acceptable with the trademark owner's consent, which the Chinese
policies did not require. 28 2 In effect, the U.S. argued that the Chinese
equivalent of the CBP's Katrina donations violated the TRIPS
Agreement, again sending mixed signals to the international
community and potentially exposing the U.S. government's own
noncompliance with the TRIPS Agreement.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

At the very minimum, the CBP should de-trademark goods prior
to future donations.
Despite the WTO Panel's conclusion, detrademarking is a prerequisite for donation regardless of whether one
interprets donation as a release within or outside the channels of
commerce. Even with regard to disposal outside the channels of
commerce, harm to the right holder is inevitable if the goods are not
de-trademarked. Under the relevant TRIPS provisions, Customs
must do everything in its power to avoid any harm to the right holder.

276.
Id.
277.
Id. (quoting Sophia Tickell, Senior Policy Advisor, Oxfam).
278.
Scafidi, supra note 9, supp.
279.
See Request for the Establishment of the Panel by the United States, supra
note 134, § II (explaining the U.S. position that the Chinese donations violated China's
TRIPS obligations).
280.
See supra note 217 (comparing the donations).
281.

Id.

282.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing the consent
prerequisite proposed by the U.S.).
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Where de-trademarking is not feasible, the CBP should resort to
other options, such as requiring affixation of the Red Cross (or other
charity) seal over the infringing mark.
In order to avoid violating TRIPS under interpretations differing
from that of the WTO Panel described above, the CBP should also
(outside of situations triggering the "exceptional case" provision of
Article 46) alter the goods to the point where they no longer look like
imitations of legitimate goods. And in order for Customs to get away
with simply de-trademarking under exceptional circumstances, the
legislature could amend the emergency statute to provide clear
emergency authorization of CBP donations-preferably one that is
not constantly triggered by the President's frequent emergency
declarations.
Of course, all of the above steps might be avoided if the CBP opts
to simply contact the right holder to gain consent prior to a
donation. 28 3 Right holders are likely to provide consent in these
situations, as they provide valuable public relations opportunities for
the brands. 28 4 However, it must be remembered that the WTO Panel
interpreted the purpose of Article 46 to go beyond preventing the
infringement of the specific trademark holder's rights and to instead
direct the disposal method to deter future infringement. 28 5 This
suggests that the consent of the right holder is by itself insufficient to
allow donating counterfeit goods in their infringing state.
Additionally, the government should not neglect the social
impact of seizing counterfeit goods, which are likely the product of
foreign slave labor conditions or fuel for terrorist organizations, and
then redirecting them to alleviate the suffering of victims in the
United States. The U.S. government could have avoided the negative
international policy implications by resorting to alternative relief
practices. The U.S. might find that foregoing all CBP donations is
the most viable option for the future.

VI. CONCLUSION

Government donation of seized counterfeit goods, under the
circumstances of the CBP's Katrina donations, presents significant

283.
In the case before the WTO Panel, the U.S. even suggested that donation
might be an acceptable option with consent of the right holder, yet nonetheless
maintained that "[o]n the other hand, allowing counterfeit goods to be used, even for
'public good,' can be harmful to a right holder in certain cases." Id.
284.
In fact, two prominent trademark owners, Sean "P. Diddy" Combs and Jay
Z, agreed to donate legitimate Sean John and Roc-A-Wear clothing to Katrina victims.
See Candace Murphy, How to Help, OAKLAND TRIB., Sept. 12, 2005, at 1, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn476/is_20050912/ai-n15808972/ (providing free
publicity to both trademark owners for their donations to Katrina victims).
285.
See supra Part III.A.i (discussing the WTO Panel Report).
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policy and legal implications. If the U.S. wishes to remain on its IP
high horse, it should avoid unnecessarily breaking the rules during
difficult times. On the other hand, common decency suggests that the
rules are made to be broken when it comes down to clothing victims
during times of emergency. This Note does not propose that IP rights
should be valued over the wellbeing of U.S. citizens. It merely argues
that the rights need not be sacrificed altogether so that the
Due to the Bush
government can make up for lost time.
Administration's slow response to Hurricane Katrina and the
resulting criticism, there was clearly pressure for the government to
do something. By making these donations without so much as detrademarking the goods or asking for consent, the government took
an imprudent route to appeasing its critics that should be avoided in
the future.
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